Almost every reviewer of the literature on laterality has noted the rapid growth of this field of enquiry. Over the past 25 years the number of papers, books and monographs has grown and continues to grow. From the 5000 or so papers which have been published on laterality since 1960, what have we learned? We have certainly acquired a considerable amount of data, and accumulated an impressive body of 'findings'; but has our understanding of the functions of the lateralized human neuropsychological system advanced? It does not seem that our fundamental understanding of the mechanisms and processes involved in this system has significantly developed over this period, and that may be because we have failed to confront certain of the major issues in laterality research. This is not to denigrate the research efforts of the psychologists and neuroscientists who have been engaged in the study oflaterality. Much, although not all, of the work has been elegant, well-designed, and sophisticated in conception. Nevertheless, although we know a great deal about neuropsychological laterality, this does not necessarily imply that we understand it; in certain significant ways we do not.
The biological context
Just over 25 years ago, at a seminal conference on interhemispheric relations and cerebral dominance, Young! was attempting to answer the question 'Why do we have two brains? ' . Surprisingly, there is still no satisfactory answer to this question. Most contemporary writers on laterality stress the importance of viewing the phenomenon in its biological and evolutionary context. This is reasonable given that we believe that lateralized aspects of behaviour can principally be explained in terms of the lateral asymmetry of physiological and neural structures. However, unless we also understand the biological aspects of human laterality, it is of little help to set the behavioural aspects in that context.
The question which Young so bravely posed is the crucial one. Why is the nervous system of so many animals bilaterally divided, and why is the afferent and efferent mapping so pervasively contralateral in its organization? His answer was to consider the need to integrate the various internal topographic representations of different sensory afferent systems. This may well be a satisfactory explanation (given that all such explanations are necessarily teleological) for the examples which he cites, such as the eye of the octopus; but his general arguments provide no insight into why the system is contralaterally organized.
There has always been a difficulty in understanding how contralateral organization first arose. It is not difficult to imagine how primitive ladder networks in simple nervous systems may have arisen, and how the two sides of the ladder became elaborated and specialized until they developed into the two lateral hemispheres of the mammalian brain. We can conceive of the advantages of such a nervous system for a morphologically bilaterally symmetric organism in dealing with a potentially symmetric planar world.f But why did the system become crossed and, more strange, how did it become crossed?
Perhaps the most attractive hint appeared during the discussion of Young's 1961 presentation" in an idea attributed to Coghill. Coghill had pointed out the importance of unilateral stimuli eliciting a contralateral muscular response as a defensive reflex. Perhaps there is some advantage to an organism in preservation from damage or harm, or for cold-blooded animals in the avoidance of temperature extremes, if the effective neural control is laterally displaced from sensory receptors and motor execution. However, the idea does not seem to have been developed in the literature. There is no other convincing explanation of how or why the entire system became contralaterally organized.
More attention has been given to why the nervous system might be divided. A common idea is that lateral duplication may have been, in some way, an insurance against the possibility of damage by providing reserve capacity. This is impossible to disprove, but it is unlikely as a biological principle.
More carefully considered schemes have been built around the idea that lateral specialization is a particularly (although not exclusively) human phenomenon. There is a range of variants of this idea which give relative primacy to the appearance of language, to the development of manual dexterity and tool use, or to bipedal locomotion, but they all share in common the idea that such factors interacted to facilitate the development of special and advanced skills in early hominids. However, this in no way provides a satisfactory explanation for the prior existence of the divided nervous system which provided such fertile ground for this advance. Division of the nervous system extends far beyond such parochial perspectives of the animal kingdom; and they are not to be so easily explained.
Other hypotheses have proposed that the laterally divided nervous system is somehow more fitted for the resolution of conflict within the brain, or alternatively for the integration of disparate elements. It is certainly the case that the divided nervous system Society of Medicine might convey some benefits for the integration of praxic activities, while at the same time creating costs for nonpraxic functions". It is easy to speculate about this kind of evolutionary cost-benefit analysis, but difficult to specify how it might operate.
The truth seems to be that we have assumed that the appearance of the divided nervous system must be adaptive because of its early appearance and durability in evolution. We consider it adaptive without being able to specify the advantages which it confers. It is then easy to consider lateral specialization as a timely sophistication of the system which creates certain opportunities for the development of, largely human, performance advances.
There is, however, an alternative possibility. No doubt the dual and crossed nervous system originally developed and persisted because it was at one time adaptive. However, once this route had been chosen it would be very difficult for the system to evolve in such a way as to reverse this evolutionary vector once committed to it. When we come to the development of human intelligence and abilities, do we have to assume that the dual hemisphere system is an efficient and well-adapted solution to the problems of neural organization? Perhaps what we are studying is a system which has to work particularly hard to overcome the disadvantages of a dual bilateral organization which evolution has bequeathed to it.
There is more than a germ of such an idea in Levy's discussion-of the role of the corpus callosum in the ontological development and lateralization of function. Her point is to argue that the callosum must playa critical role in governing the development of hemispheric organization, and that it is involved in central attentional and regulatory functions.
There is a final point to be made about the biological and evolutionary context within which laterality is to be analysed. This concerns the folly of considering the cerebral hemispheres as independent of the subcortical and midbrain systems into which they are inextricably tied. This point has been made before, but has been frequently neglected. However, it relates more naturally to the consideration of performance asymmetries.
The significance of performance asymmetries Another issue is the attribution of observed performance asymmetries to cerebrallateralization. Although the phenomena of laterality research do not necessarily demand such an explanation, no major current theory of lateral asymmetries fails to incorporate a significant role for a biological, hemispheral, substrate. It is essential to keep sight of the fact that the involvement ofthe cerebral hemispheres in these lateral effects is only inferred and not directly observed.
After a period in which there was considerable confidence in the cerebral explanation of these effects" a reappraisal of the validity of such inferences is now taking place. A recent series of papers has stimulated new interest in such factors as reading habits, scanning bias and stimulus orientation. A debate among Boles", Kirsner and Schwartz's", Bryden!" and Hellige-! has exposed a number of concerns about divided visual field methodology.
Sergent and Hellige 12 -14 also believe that the perceptual characteristics of the stimulus are important in determining performance asymmetries, and that one of the most potent of these characteristics is the spatial-frequency spectral composition of the stimuli. Kitterle'f has reviewed the psychophysical aspects of this experimental paradigm.
Further questions over the essential involvement of the cerebral hemispheres are raised by the work on the role of lateral hernispace as distinct from lateral visual hemifield in the generation of asymmetries (see Corballis!" for a discussion), as well as by that on induced lateral orientation'? A recent report by Levy and Kueck 18 gave evidence of lateral asymmetry in a lexical rhyming search task in free vision, which the authors interpret in the tradition of lateral hemispatial effects, parallel to the divided visual field effects and so attributable to cerebrallateralization. There are, however, alternative explanations of these findings which involve non-hemispheral attentional variables, as well as anomalies in the hemispheral interpretations of such findings'", A particularly interesting recent report has come from Gazzaniga and Ladavas-", They investigated the role of lateralization of external (gravitational) space in contrast to retinotopic lateral space, by requiring subjects to tilt the head 90 0 to the left or right when viewing a standard tachistoscopic display. The surprising result was that even when, as a result of the head tilt, the two stimuli placed to the left and right in gravitational space fell in the same retinal hemifield (and were projected, therefore, to the same hemisphere) the 'hemisphere asymmetry' was still to be observed. The very significant implication of this demonstration is that attention and associated laterality effects may function with respect to an internal representation of lateralized external space, rather than being associated with the projection of stimuli to one or the other cerebral hemisphere.
These reviews and empirical reports together cast a considerable shadow of doubt over the attribution of performance asymmetries to hemispheric asymmetries. Until recently this attribution seemed secure, yet now many alternative explanations and confounding factors have been seen to be more important than once thought.
The asymmetries undoubtedly exist, and there is some cerebral basis for them. However, it is becoming clear that we have neglected the influence of many other extracerebral psychological factors. Where the influence of hemispheric specialization remains, the lateral asymmetries are small in magnitude and subject to considerable individual variability. This must force us to question the psychological meaning and significance of these effects.
Cerebral lateralization: an abnormal phenomenon?
There is another issue which has to be faced. This is to ask the question whether what we infer to be cerebral lateralization might simply be a product of abnormal processes. Possibly this argument can be taken too far, but there are at least some grounds to think that what we are examining is an abnormal phenomenon which arises from processes which do not normally operate in the intact brain.
The suspicion arises from a now widespread recognition that the experimental paradigm most used in laterality research, the divided visual field experiment, involves a most unusual mode of stimulus presentation and requires very subtle laboratory control before the effects can be demonstrated. At best, it is the case that subjects are operating upon stimuli which are presented at a location which is not familiar, and generally without sufficient practice to provide even elementary familiarization. At worst, and the matter becomes more significant as greater eccentricities are used in stimulus presentation, the experimenter is requiring the subject to use quite different perceptual systems from those generally employed for the type of simple cognitive task being executed. This has been known at least since the work of Trevarthen-". Kitterle's recent review-" supports the kind of distinction which Trevarthen made between processes involved in central and in peripheral vision.
If we seriously entertain these doubts about the inferences drawn from neuropsychological research, is there any alternative evidence which points more directly to the existence of cerebral asymmetries under normal conditions of performance? There is a little, but not much. Four forms of evidence are available to be called at this point.
The first relates to the phenomenon of lateral eye movements. However, the principal review by Ehrlichman and Weinberger'f came to the clear conclusion that there was no evidence that lateral eye movements are necessarily related to cerebral asymmetry. Subsequent research has not provided evidence which might modify this conclusion-I-". Lateral eye movements cannot bear alone the responsibility of demonstrating the validity of hemispheral laterality.
The second area of evidence is the growing topic of the investigation of 'free-field' effects: lateral asymmetries which can be demonstrated in unconstrained vision, or which relate to dimensions of extrapersonal space rather than individual perceptual channels. The evidence is not very extensive, although it is growing, and is undoubtedly of some significance. The point to note is that even when explanations of this type of data involve lateralized cerebral processes, they are nevertheless expressed through efferent, attentional, processes. In other words, they do not intrinsically rely upon the presence of hemisphere asymmetries.
The third type of investigation has shown that there are physiological and anatomical asymmetries between the hemispheres. There seems little doubt that such anatomical asymmetries exist. The problem is to show that they actually relate to functional asymmetry. The evidence for electrophysiological asymmetries is a little more difficult to evaluate because of the methodological difficulties inherent in this research 25 -27 • The fourth and final area which might be taken to support the existence of functional cerebral asymmetries is the research on handedness. Most modern accounts of the origins of handedness place considerable emphasis on hemispheric differences'". Nevertheless, we have to remind ourselves that the involvement of cerebral laterality is only by inference:
We have no direct evidence for it save by inference through the other techniques discussed above. The fact is that the study of handedness cannot in itself tell us anything directly about the brain.
I hope that the point is clear that the most rigorous appraisal of the evidence might cause us to doubt whether cerebral laterality exists at all. Even if we assume that we can accept, despite some doubts about the validity of the phenomenon, that cerebral laterality does exist as one of the bases of behavioural Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine Volume 82 October 1989 611 laterality, it still remains to question whether such an arrangement characterizes the normally functioning brain. Behavioural laterality is certainly a feature of natural performance; the pervasive nature of manual preference is the most obvious example. Hemispheric laterality, on the other hand, cannot be demonstrated under such conditions. The nearest evidence comes from physiological studies of electrical brain activity and of cerebral blood flow: but for methodological reasons cannot be unambiguously associated with cognitive task asymmetries. Other forms of evidence are too open to an explanation by attentional mechanisms which need not necessarily rest upon interhemispheric differences.
The very real possibility must exist that such differences between the hemispheres as can be demonstrated in clinical and experimental psychology are a by-product of the system being configured in an abnormal mode of operation. The literature on hemisphere asymmetry might therefore have little relevance to explanations of the normal range of cognitive operations. If this is true, it might also mean that hemisphere asymmetry is less of a salient explanation for natural behavioural laterality than we have supposed.
